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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Monte George Hoffman timely appeals from the district court's Order Dismissing
Petition for Post Conviction Relief in which the district court summarily dismissed all of
Mr. Hoffman's post-conviction claims. Mr. Hoffman asserts that the district court
committed numerous errors in summarily dismissing his claims, including improperly
taking judicial notice of the "underlying criminal file," completely disregarding the factual
assertions contained in Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings, and applying a plethora of
incorrect legal standards to Mr. Hoffman's claims. Because of the district court's
numerous errors, and because there are genuine issues of material fact which, if
resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, justify the granting of post conviction relief,
Mr. Hoffman respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his post conviction petition and remand this case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hoffman was driving a borrowed car that he was considering purchasing.

(R., p.11.) As he backed out of parking space at McDonald's, he saw that both
headlights were working. (R., p.6.) He had only been driving the car for about fifteen
minutes when officers stopped him, claiming the car had a broken headlight. (R., pp.6,
15.) The officers then detained Mr. Hoffman, while investigating and charging him with
"several misdemeanors." (R., p.7.) Without Mr. Hoffman's consent, and without a
warrant, officers searched the trunk of the car Mr. Hoffman had been driving and
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discovered paraphernalia with residue. (R., pp. 7, 24, 126.) Although the officer asserted
that the search was done pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement, Mr. Hoffman had already been removed from the vehicle before it
was searched and items in the trunk of the car were not within Mr. Hoffman's reaching
distance. (R., pp. 7-8, 144.) The search of the car was actually done for investigative
purposes. (R., p. 7.)
Mr. Hoffman was charged with possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.42.)
Public Defender John Dewey was initially appointed to represent him. (R., pp.12, 42.)
Mr. Dewey never filed a request for discovery, nor did he file a motion to suppress any
evidence. (R., pp.12-13; See also R., p.8 (asserting that Mr. Hoffman did not receive
discovery items and the State never provided discovery).) One week later, Mr. Hoffman
retained l\llike Neilson for representation in the case. (R., p.42.)
A jury trial was scheduled for April 24, 2008. (R., p.42.) The prosecutor filed a
request for discovery in March. (R., pp.43, 177-78.) Despite the impending trial,
Mr. Neilson never filed a request for discovery and never filed a motion to suppress
evidence. (R., pp.3, 5, 13 ; see also R., pp.42-43, R., p.8.) Instead, on April 18, 2004,
less than a week before the scheduled trial, Mr. Neilson withdrew as counsel for
Mr. Hoffman. (R., pp.13-14, 43.)
The jury trial was vacated and Mr. Hoffman was ordered to obtain new counsel.
(R., p.43.) A week later, Dave Martinez, a public defender, was appointed to represent
Mr. Hoffman. (R., pp.14, 43.) Mr. Hoffman repeatedly instructed this court appointed
attorney to file a motion to suppress. (R., p.8.) Mr. Martinez filed neither a request for
discovery nor a motion to suppress evidence. (R., pp.14, 43; see also R., p.8.)
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Because none of his attorneys had requested discovery or pursued any defenses
at all, and because the State was threatening him with a persistent violator
enhancement despite the fact that Mr. Hoffman waived his right to a preliminary hearing
to avoid that possibility, Mr. Hoffman felt coerced into pleading guilty. (R., pp.10, 13,
15.) Thus, with Mr. Martinez by his side, Mr. Hoffman pleaded guilty to the charge of
possession of methamphetamine. (Tr. 7/7/2008, p.8, Ls.13-16.)
Before sentencing, Mr. Hoffman's attorney was changed to Kelly Mallard, and
Mr. Hoffman asked Mr. Mallard to file a motion to withdraw his plea. (R., p.17.) Although
some sort of motion was filed, Mr. Mallard later withdrew the motion without having
requested

discovery,

reviewed

the

record,

Mr. Hoffman. (R., pp.16; Supp. R., pp.31-32;

or

reviewed

discovery items with

see a/so R., p.8.)

The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with two years fixed,
upon Mr. Hoffman, but retained jurisdiction. (Supp. R., p.35.) Immediately following the
entry of the Judgment of Conviction, thus during the period of retained jurisdiction,
Mr. Mallard sent Mr. Hoffman a letter regarding his right to appeal. (R., p.37.) This letter
claimed that Mr. Hoffman had only 42 days to file an appeal, and told Mr. Hoffman that if
he wanted an appeal he not only had to notify Mr. Mallard "immediately," but that he
also had to notify Mr. Mallard of "grounds that are appealable." (R., p.37.) The letter
further offered as an example of "legal grounds" for direct appeal "ineffective assistance
of counsel." (R., p.37.)
Mr. Hoffman attempted to contact Mr. Mallard to request that an appeal be filed.
(R., p.37.) He also "specifically asked/requested Kelly to file a Direct appeal of the
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original sentence through letters, family members calling." (R., p.18.) A notice of appeal
was not filed. (R., p.19.)
The Department of Corrections recommended that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman. (R., p.40.) A rider review hearing was scheduled, then
rescheduled, but Mr. Mallard failed to appear at either hearing. (R., pp.17, 39, 40.) After
Mr. Mallard finally did appear at a hearing, without Mr. Hoffman, the district court
relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman. (R., p.127, Supp. R.,p.38.) Pursuant to an
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinaffer, Rule 35) motion, Mr. Hoffman's sentence was later
reduced to four years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.22, 125.)
Mr. Hoffman filed a timely Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, and
attached exhibits to support some of his claims. (R., pp.1-45.) Mr. Hoffman's claims
included allegations that each of the four attorneys that represented him rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel when each failed to request discovery, failed to file a
motion to suppress evidence, failed to file a requested appeal, and failed to properly
consult with Mr. Hoffman about and appeal. (R., pp.9, 12-17, 17-19.) Finally,
Mr. Hoffman asserted that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily
entered because it was coerced by defense counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel.
(R., pp.2, 9, 10, 13-14, 23-24, 30.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that, if counsel had reviewed
discovery, counsel would have found that Mr. Hoffman had a defense to the charge of
possession of a controlled substance because he had just picked up the car he was
driving and there was no evidence to prove that the paraphernalia found in the case
belonged to him. (R., pp.15-16.)
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Mr. Hoffman requested the appointment of counsel in his post conviction action,
which the district court granted. (R., pp.51-53, 60-61.)
The State filed an Answer to Mr. Hoffman's petition. (R., pp.78-81.) In the answer
the State generally denied Mr. Hoffman's substantive claims, asserting that they were
"conclusory." (R., p.79-80.) The State also asserted that Mr. Hoffman's petition failed to
state any grounds upon which relief could be granted, that the claims were procedurally
defaulted "to the extent [the] claims should have been raised on direct appeal," and that
the petition "contains bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by affidavits,
records, or other admissible evidence .... " (R., p.80.) Therefore, the State requested that
Mr. Hoffman's claims be denied or dismissed. (R., p.81.) The State offered no affidavits
or exhibits to support its answer. (See generally R., pp.78-83.)
Counsel appointed to represent Mr. Hoffman filed a Brief In Support of Post
Conviction Relief And Response To State's Answer. (R., pp.84-90.) This document
restated Mr. Huffman's claims, but did not discuss the factual assertions made in
Mr. Hoffman's

verified

petition,

affidavit,

or

exhibits.

(R.,

pp.84-90.)

Despite

Mr. Hoffman's claims regarding the lack of requests for discovery in the criminal case,
post conviction counsel did not request discovery in the post conviction action. ( See
generally R., pp.84-90.)

Thereafter, the district court entered an Order Vacating Hearing in which it
affirmatively stated that it would "solely rely on filed pleadings from Petitioner and
counsel to make a determination in regard to post conviction relief." (R., p.91.)
Nevertheless, the district court then investigated the case on its own by obtaining and
reviewing the file in Mr. Hoffman's underlying criminal case. (R., p.93.) In the Notice of
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Intent to Dismiss, the court stated that it had "carefully reviewed" the "record in the
underlying case." (R., p.94.) The court also cited to some of the items in the underlying
record. (R., pp.93, 102,103,104,107,108,110, 111-112.)
In regard to Mr. Hoffman's assertion that his attorneys rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel when they failed to obtain discovery, the district court found that
"a Request for Discovery was filed on March 13, 2008." (R., p.102.) The court added,
"Mr. Hoffman presented no alternative version of the facts that his attorney(s) failed to
discover that may have changed the outcome of his case." (R., p.102.) The court further
found, "Even accepting as true that his attorney(s) did not provide him with materials or
discuss the case, the Petitioner presents no evidence, or even an allegation, about how
further discussions with his attorney would have changed the outcome of his case."
(R., p.102.) Finally, the court found that Mr. Hoffman's "contentions are no more than
conclusory allegations" and Mr. Hoffman had not "satisfied his burden of demonstrating
that his counsel's conduct was deficient ... and that he was prejudiced .... " (R., p.102.)
The court similarly found that Mr. Hoffman's claim that his attorneys rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel when each failed to file a motion to suppress was "a
conclusory allegation, as the Petitioner offered no factual basis or evidentiary support."
(R., p.103.) The court also gave notice of its intent to dismiss this claim because "a
petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is not allowed to raise any issue that could
have been raised in a direct appeal. .. " (R., p.103.) Finally, the court intended to dismiss
the claim because, "Mr. Hoffman did not raise this issue at the time he entered his guilty
plea, at which time he waived all claims he might have for violations of civil and
constitutional rights." (R., p.103.) The court conciuded that because Mr. Hoffman had
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offered no evidence in support "of the claim that his due process rights were violated by
an allegedly illegal search and seizure beyond his conclusory allegations and because a
post conviction proceeding is not the forum to make a claim regarding failure to
suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized, the Petitioner has failed to assert a
cognizable claim in this regard." (R., p.104.)
The district court found that Mr. Hoffman's claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a timely appeal despite requests
to do so was "disproved by the record." (R., p.105.) The court's finding was premised
upon the fact that letters Mr. Hoffman sent to his attorney, after the time to appeal had
expired, did not include a request for an appeal, and because there were letters from
Mr. Mallard to Mr. Hoffman "neither of which verifies the Petitioner's claims that he
requested Mr. Mallard file an appeal on his behalf." (R., p.105-106.) The court also
found that "no argument is made regarding how the outcome of his case would have
changed." (R., p.106.)
In regard to Mr. Hoffman's claim that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily entered because it was coerced by ineffective assistance of counsel, the
court found that Mr. Hoffman "waived his right to put on a defense or challenge any of
the charges against him when he chose to plead guilty." (R., p.106.) The court noted
that in the "Guilty Questionnaire" Mr. Hoffman had stated that he had discussed the
case with his attorney and understood he was "giving up all his rights under the 4 th , 5th ,
and 6 th Amendments to the Constitution .... " (R., p.106-07.) The court also found that
"there was no contention at the time Mr. Hoffman pied guilty that his attorney had failed
to discuss the case with him or explain possible defenses." (R., p.107.) Based upon the
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fact that during the guilty plea hearing Mr. Hoffman had stated that his attorney had
"explained to you possible defenses you could raise to the Court or jury," even if none of
his attorneys had actually discussed potential defenses with him, "this court clearly
informed Mr. Hoffman of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty rather than
proceeding to trial." (R., p.108.) The court concluded that "Mr. Hoffman has not provided
any facts or evidence to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency or
how such deficiency changed the outcome of his case." (R., pp.108.) Thus, the court
intended to dismiss Mr. Hoffman's claim.
Regarding all of Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the
district court determined, "Mr. Hoffman did not offer any specific facts or evidence
showing ineffectiveness ... ," "did not offer any specific facts or evidence or make any
argument as to how he was prejudiced ... " and "offered no evidence that the outcome of
his case would have been different but for his attorneys' unprofessional errors."
(R., pp.112-13.) The court concluded, "Mr. Hoffman has only offered bare and
conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence, he has not proven
his

allegations

regarding

ineffective

assistance

by

a

preponderance

of the

evidence ..... Thus, his claims of ineffective assistance must be dismissed on that basis,
as well." (R., p.113.)
Mr. Hoffman filed, pro se, a request for additional time to resporld to the court's
notice of intent to dismiss. (R., pp.122-23.) In that motion, Mr. Hoffman notified the
court, "Petitioner attempted to convince prior legal counsel to present these issues but
was ignored or denied each time," and "Under the circumstances petitioner must seek
assistance from other inmates .... " (R., p.122.)
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Ten days later, Mr. Hoffman filed, pro se, a verified Modified Motion For Post
Conviction Relief And Attached Affidavit In Support. (R., p.124-30.) In that document,
Mr. Hoffman offered additional factual support for his claims, including assertions that
he would not have agreed to plead guilty had discovery been provided because "the
loss of the wrongly obtained evidence would have resulted in an acquittal." (R., p.127;
see also R., p.128.) He also informed the court that "many of the documents which the
petitioners requires in order to prove his case have been denied to him by the
prosecutor and by his own legal counsel." (R., p.129.) "As a result, much of the
documentation cannot be provided by the petitioner at this time, until his repeated
requests for discovery are finally fulfilled." (R., p.129.) Therefore, he asked the court to
provide him with: 1) audio recordings of the traffic stop, 2) a copy of any traffic citation
for the broken headlight, 3) police reports regarding the stop, and 4) audio recordings
from all court proceedings in the underlying case. (R., p.129.) Mr. Hoffman also again
requested the appointment of counsel. (R., p.129.)
About two weeks later, Mr. Hoffman again filed, prose, a verified Modified Motion
for Post Conviction Relief, And Attached Affidavit In Support, and included a verified
Memorandum In Support of Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.131-54.) The memorandum
offered further factual support for his claims. Mr. Hoffman asserted that the traffic stop
was based upon a malfunctioning headlight, but that the headlight was not
malfunctioning and "he personally observed the fact that both headlights were functional
just prior to the traffic stop." (R., p.143.) In addition, the officer asserted that the search
was done pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement, but Mr. Hoffman had already been removed from the vehicle before it was
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searched. (R., p.144.) He also asserted that, after Mr. Martinez was appointed to
represent him, he "was informed that if he was unwilling to plead guilty that his attorney
was unwilling and unprepared to present a defense." (R., p.140.) Thus, he pleaded
guilty because "it was impossible under the circumstances to obtain a full and fair
hearing .... " (R., p.145.)
In addition, Mr. Hoffman stated that his attorney had informed him that "the fact
that he was driving the vehicle was enough to convict him of possession." (R., p.146.)
He stated that, "petitioners [sic] counsel failed or refused to inform him that the
knowledge of the presence and nature of an item is required to prove possession."
(R., p.146.) Mr. Hoffman further asserted that if his constitutional rights had not been
violated, he could "have presented a defense which may have included witness's [sic] to
the fact that petitioner was not aware of the presence of the items in question."
(R., p.145.) Mr. Hoffman again requested discovery, and noted that "At no time, even to
the present has said discovery has been [sic] provided." (R., p.147.)
The district court entered an Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction relief.
(R., pp.155-.165) In that order, the district court first incorporated its findings from the
Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (R., p.156.) The district court also denied Mr. Hoffman's
request for discovery finding, despite Mr. Hoffman's assertions that his attorney had
denied him access to the documents that would support his claims, that "Mr. Hoffman's
requests for 'discovery' or other documents should be made of his attorney and not this
court." (Compare R., p.129, 158.)
The court further addressed the assertions of fact and issues raised in
Mr. Hoffman's additional verified pleadings. (R., pp.156-65.) The court found that
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Mr. Hoffman had not offered evidence of his claim that his plea was not knowingly,
intelligently, or voluntarily entered and only "sets forth self-serving statements and legal
conclusions, but does not point to the record or offer other proof to support his
contentions." {R., p.160.) In regards to Mr. Hoffman's claim that his plea was the result
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that "the two sentences offered in
support of this contention amount to general allegations, as the Petitioner does not cite
to the record or offer other facts or proof. Mr. Hoffman does not even explain what
'required discovery' was denied him." (R., p.161.) The court again reiterated, "because
Mr. Hoffman did not raise the issue of his constitutional rights at the time he entered his
guilty plea and because Mr. Hoffman has not offered any supporting evidence beyond
his conclusory allegations, the Petitioner has failed to assert a cognizable claim."
(R., pp.161-62.)
In addressing Mr. Hoffman's other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
district court found that Mr. Hoffman had "only re-alleged these claims without the
required accompanying competent and admissible evidence, such allegations again
amount to bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts." (R., p.164.)
The court dismissed all of Mr. Hoffman's claims. (R., p.11.)
Mr. Hoffman timely appealed the order dismissing his post conviction petition.
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err when, in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's petition for
post conviction relief, it improperly took judicial notice of "the record in the
underlying case?"

2.

Did the district court err when, in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's petition for
post conviction relief, it failed to consider the factual allegations made in
Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings?

3.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel?

4.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claim that his
plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because it was the
result of ineffective assistance of counsel?
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ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Erred When It Improperly Took Judicial Notice Of 'The Record
In The Underlying Case" And Any Items From The Underlying Criminal Action Not
Specifically Identified By The District Court Are Not Part Of The Record In This Post
Conviction Case

A.

Introduction
ln summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's post conviction claims, the district court

stated that it had it had "carefully reviewed" the "record in the underlying case."
Thereafter the district court specifically identified some of the documents it was relying
upon to deny Mr. Hoffman's claims when it cited to the items in the Notice of Intent to
Dismiss and the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Because the
district court did not properly take judicial notice of "the record in the underlying case"
Mr. Hoffman submits that any portions of that record not specifically cited by the district
court were not part of the record below and, thus, are not part of the record in this post
conviction appeal. Accordingly, the absence of any items not specifically cited by the
district court cannot be presumed to support the district court's findings in this case.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Improperly Took Judicial Notice Of "The Record
ln The Underlying Case" Or Alternatively When It Considered Evidence Not In
The Reco rd
I\Jeither party in this case requested that the district court take judicial notice of

documents from the district court's file in the underlying criminal case. (See generally
Record.) The district court initially entered an Order Vacating Hearing in which it
affirmatively stated that it would "solely rely on filed pleadings from Petitioner and
counsel to make a determination in regard to post conviction relief." (R., p.91.)
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Nevertheless, the district court then investigated the case on its own, obtaining and
reviewing the -file in Mr. Hoffman's underlying criminal case. (R., p.93.) In the Notice of
Intent to Dismiss, the court stated that it had "carefully reviewed" the "record in the
underlying case." (R., p.94.) The court also cited to some of the items in the underlying
record.(R., pp.93, 102,103,104,107,108,110, 111-112.)Mr. Hoffman asserts that the
district court erred when it apparently took judicial notice of "the record in the underlying
case."
A post-conviction proceeding is not an extension of the criminal case from which
it arises. Rather, it is a separate civil action in which the applicant bears the burden of
proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 536 (1986). l\lo part
of the record from the criminal case becomes part of the record in the post-conviction
proceeding unless it is entered as a exhibit. Transcripts of the pretrial proceedings, the
trial, and sentencing hearing in the criminal case, even if previously prepared as a result
of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not before the trial court in the post-conviction
proceeding and do not become part of the record on appeal unless presented as
exhibits. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648 (Ct. App. 1994 ).
Because neither party asked the district court to take judicial notice of the district
court's own file in the underlying criminal case, at best the district court could only take
judicial notice under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201 ( c). That rule states: "When
discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not. When a court
takes judicial notice of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same or
a separate case, the court shall identify the specific documents or items that were so
noticed." 1.R.E. 201 (c). However, the district court did not do so in this case. Instead, the
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district court "carefully reviewed ... the record in the underlying case." (R., p.94.)
Accordingly the district court erred.
Because the district court only properly took judicial notice of some of the items
in the underlying criminal record, those being the items specifically identified by the
court in the Notice of Intent to Dismiss, only those items are properly part of the record
in this case. Any other items which were not specifically identified were not properly
taken notice of and, therefore, are not part of the record in this post conviction case. As
such, the fact that any other items are missing from the record on appeal cannot be
presumed to support the conclusions of the district court. Compare State v. Coma, 133
Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) ("It is well established that an appellant bears the burden
to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of
the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal,
they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court.").

11.
The District Court Erred When, In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hoffman's Claims, It Failed
To Consider The Facts Alleged In Mr. Hoffman's Verified Pleadings
A.

Introduction
Throughout Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings he made a number of factual

assertions. Yet, in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's petition, the district court
repeatedly stated that Mr. Hoffman had failed to support rris claims with facts or
admissible evidence. Because the question of whether Mr. Hoffman's petition was
improperly summarily dismissed depends upon whether there are genuine issues of
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material fact, Mr. Hoffman wishes to clarify what factual assertions should have been
considered by the district court, and must be considered by this Court on review.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Consider The Facts Alleged In
Mr. Hoffman's Verified Pleadings
Mr. Hoffman submitted a series of verified pleadings to the district court in

support of his post conviction claims, including his Petition, Affidavit of Facts In Support
of Post Conviction Petition, Modified Motion for Post Conviction Relief and Attached
Affidavit In Support filed June 2, 2010, Modified Motion for Post Conviction Relief and
Attached Affidavit In Support filed July 8, 2010, and the Memorandum In Support of
Post Conviction Relief. (See R., pp.4, 31, 130, 137, 150.) In these pleadings, in addition
to making his legal claims, Mr. Hoffman made factual assertions regarding his claims.
(See R., pp.1-31, 124-50.) Throughout the Notice of Intent to Dismiss and the Order
Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district court repeatedly found that
Mr. Hoffman had not offered facts in support of his claims. (See R., pp.92-117, 155-65.)
In light of the district court's repeated assertions that Mr. Hoffman had offered no facts
or evidence in support of his claims, despite the numerous factual allegations in

Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings, it appears that the district court determined that facts
in a verified pleading cannot be considered when a court determines whether summary
dismissal is appropriate. The district court erred and, on review, this Court must
consider the facts alleged in the verified pleadings.
"Verification means attestation under oath as to the truth, etc. of the pleadings
and is, perforce, a personal ceremony .... " Updegraff v. Adams, 66 Idaho 795, 799
(1946). Accordingly, "[a] verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the
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personal knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is
accorded the same probative force as an affidavit." Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588
(Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). Furthermore, affidavits are admissible evidence in a
post conviction proceeding. In an evidentiary hearing, "The court may receive proof by
affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence and may order the applicant
brought before it for the hearing." I.C. § 19-4907(a).
Because Mr. Hoffman's verified pleadings had the same probative force as an
affidavit and were admissible evidence, in considering summary judgment, the district
court was required to consider the facts alleged within those pleadings. See I.C. § 194906(b). The district court's failure to consider those facts was error. In addition, on
review of the summary dismissal of Mr. Hoffman's claims, this Court must properly
consider the facts alleged in the verified pleadings.
The impact of the district court's error in failing to consider the facts alleged in the
verified pleadings is discussed in relation to the relevant claims below.

Ill.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claims Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

A

Introduction
Mr. Hoffman asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As will be discussed in detail below, the
district court incorrectly found that Mr. Hoffman's claims were bare and conclusory,
unsupported by admissible evidence, waived by Mr. Hoffman's guilty plea, and waived
by the failure to assert them on direct appeal. In addition, the district court applied
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various incorrect legal standards to Mr. Hoffman's claims. For these reasons, and
because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Hoffman received
ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hoffman respectfully requests that the district
court's order summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims be
vacated, and this case remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.

B.

Applicable Legal Standards
1.

Summary Dismissal Standards

An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State,
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. The
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations,
or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id.
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for relief when the court is satisfied
the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by further
proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case where
evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, despite the
poss.ibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be responsible for
resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444
(2008)(addressing case where State did not file a response to petition) (citing Riverside
Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982)(addressing case with stipulated facts).)

However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the petitioner's
unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions.
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).
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Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a
material issue of fact. J.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that
would entitle the applicant to relief, if resolved in the applicant's favor, summary
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Baldwin v. State,
145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008).
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that appl;ed by the
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho 903
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Owen v.

State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997).

2.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the

Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685.
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
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objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the
Ameri 4an Bar Association, Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998).

In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),

If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different,"
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the
proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
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Despite the general rule, a presumption of prejudice arises in certain instances.
This presumption applies when there is a complete denial of counsel during a critical
stage of the proceedings, when circumstances are such that the likelihood that any
lawyer could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial, and when counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. See e.g., United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That
His Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Each Failed To
File A Request For Discovery
Throughout his verified pleadings, Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when each failed to request discovery in his
criminal case. (R., pp.2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 26. 29, 127-28, 140.) He also attached
a copy of the relevant portion of the register of actions in his criminal case, which
reflects that defense counsel never filed a request for discovery with the court.
(R., pp.42-43.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that, had his attorneys obtained discovery,

"obvious defences [sic] would have become evident, and thereby persued [sic] .... "
(R., p.15.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys would have discovered a "lack of

evidence to prove the paraphernalia even belonged to the defendant." (R., p.16.) He
asserted that none of his attorneys "provided a discovery," and absent this ineffective
assistance of counsel "The case could have resulted in a conviction for misdemeanor
paraphernalia if not dismissed due to lack of evidence and illegal search and seizure."
(R., pp.20-21.) Mr. Hoffman asserted, "other than his presence in the vehicle the
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petitioner is innocent to this charge .... " (R., p.11.) Finally, Mr. Hoffman asserted that he
would not have pleaded guilty had discovery been provided. (R., pp.127, 128.)
Mr. Hoffman also made factual assertions to support his claims. He asserted
that, on the night the drugs were found, he was driving a borrowed car that he was
considering purchasing. (R., p.11.) As he backed out of a parking space at McDonald's,
he saw that both headlights were working. (R., p.6.) He had only been driving the car for
about fifteen minutes when officers stopped him, claiming the car had a broken
headlight. (R., pp.6, 15.) The officers then detained Mr. Hoffman and charged him with
"several misdemeanors." (R., p.7.) Without Mr. Hoffman's consent, and without a
warrant, officers searched the trunk of the car Mr. Hoffman had been driving and
discovered paraphernalia with residue. (R., pp.?, 24, 126.) The officer asserted that the
search of the car was done pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement, yet items in the trunk of the car were not within Mr. Hoffman's
reaching distance. (R., pp.7-8, 144.)
In addition to his factual allegations, Mr. Hoffman informed the court that he still
had not obtained the discovery from his criminal case. (R., pp.3, 7, 24.)
In its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the district court found that Mr. Hoffman's
contentions were "no more than conclusory allegations." (R., p.102.) The court based its
determination on the assertions that, "the record shows that a Request for Discovery
was filed on March 13, 2008," and "Mr. Hoffman presented no alternative version of the
facts that his attorney(s) failed to discover that may have changed the outcome of the
case." (R., p.102.) The court determined that "The petitioner supplies no additional facts
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that would reasonably merit further investigation, nor does he provide evidence of any
discovery that his attorney(s) failed to complete." (R., p.102.)
In his Motion for Extension of Time to respond to the Court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, Mr. Hoffman explained that he had "attempted to convince prior legal counsel
to present these issues but was ignored or denied each time." (R., p.122 (emphasis
added.) He also noted that he was having to seek assistance from other inmates, which
was difficult as it would result in punishment from the prison administration. (R., p.123.)
In his response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss, -filed prose, Mr. Hoffman
again requested the appointment of legal counsel. (R., p.129.) He also asserted that
"many of the documents which the petitioner requires in order to prove his case have
been denied to him by the prosecutor and by his own legal counsel." (R., p.129.)
Further, "As a result, much of the documentation cannot be provided by the petitioner at
this time, until his repeated requests for discovery are finally fulfilled." (R., p.129.)
In its subsequent Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district
court found Mr. Hoffman had on "only re-alleged" his claims regarding his counsel's
failure to obtain discovery, "without the required accompanying competent and
admissible evidence, such allegations again amount to bare assertions and speculation,
unsupported by specific facts." (R. , p.164.) The court noted,
For example, Mr. Hoffman failed to demonstrate that his counsels'
performance fell outside the wide range of professional norms. Secondly,
even accepting the Petitioner's claim that his counsel was inadequate, the
Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no evidence
that the outcome of his case would have been drfferent but for his
attorneys' unprofessional errors. Therefore, the Petitioner has not met his
burden of demonstrating that his counsel's performance was deficient and
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. As such, the Petitioner's claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel are without merit.
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(R., p.164.)

1.

The Fact That The State Filed A Request For Discovery Is Not Relevant
To The Question Of Whether Mr. Hoffman's Counsel Rendered Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel When Each Failed To File A Request For
Discovery

In part, the district court based its dismissal of Mr. Hoffman's assertion of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a discovery request on its finding that
"the record shows that a Request for Discovery was filed on March 13, 2008 .... "
(R., p.102.) In fact, a Request for Discovery was filed on March 13, 2008. (R., p.177.)
This was a request filed by the State. (R., p.177.) The request asked the defense to
provide information to the State, but does not provide any information to the defense.
(R., pp.177-79.)
'"Relevant Evidence"' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. In the
present case, the State's request for discovery is not of consequence to the
determination of whether Mr. Hoffman's counsel rendered deficient performance in
failing to file a request for discovery, or of whether Mr. Hoffman was prejudiced by
counsels' failure to do so. The fact that the State sought discovery does not make it
more probable or less probable that Mr. Hoffman's counsel filed a discovery request or
properly investigated the facts of Mr. Hoffman's case. Thus, the State's request for
discovery is not evidence relevant to Mr. Hoffman's claims, and the district court erred
when it relied upon that document in dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claims.
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2.

There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether
Mr. Hoffman's Counsel Rendered Deficient Performance When Each
Failed To File A Request For Discovery Which, If Resolved In
Mr. Hoffman's Favor, Would Entitle Him To The Requested Post
Conviction Relief

The district court's findings that Mr. Hoffman's contentions were "no more than
conclusory allegations" (R., p.102), that Mr. Hoffman "failed to demonstrate that his
counsels' performance fell outside the wide range of professional norms" (R., p.164),
failed to provide "the required accompanying competent and admissible evidence"
(R., p.164), presented only "bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific
facts" (R., p.164), is simply incorrect.
Throughout his verified pleadings, Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys failed
to request or provide to him discovery in his case. (R., pp.2, 12, 13, 14, 16, 21, 26, 29,
127-28.) He also attached a copy of the relevant portion of the register of actions in his
criminal case, which reflects that defense counsel never filed a request for discovery
with the court. (R., pp.42-43.) In the single pleading filed by the State, it did not stipulate
to these facts, but rather generally denied all allegations not specifically admitted. (See
R., pp.78-83.) Although the State didn't stipulate to the facts alleged, neither did it rebut
them. (See R., pp.78-83.) Thus, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Mr. Hoffman's attorneys ever investigated his case or obtained discovery
materials.
If resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, the facts would entitle Mr. Hoffman to post
conviction relief. Because the State did not stipulate to the facts alleged, the facts were
in dispute, and both the district court and this Court are required to accept
Mr. Hoffman's unrebutted factual allegations as true in deciding whether summary
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dismissal was appropriate in this case. See Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Taking
Mr. Hoffman's assertion, that not one of the four attorneys that represented him filed a
request for discovery or obtained discovery materials, as true, Mr. Hoffman's attorneys
performed deficiently.
Inadequate preparation prior to trial may be sufficient to show deprivation of the
right to effective assistance of counsel. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145-46
(Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). "Strategic choices made after less than complete
investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
A reasonable investigation in any Idaho criminal case certainly includes obtaining
items which the State will likely rely upon to prosecute a defendant and which is readily
available to the defense through simply filing a discovery request. "Looking at a file the
prosecution says it will use is a sure bet: whatever may be in that file is going to tell
defense counsel something about what the prosecution can produce." Rompi//a v.

Beard, 545 U.S. 37 4, 389 (2005). Thus, the effective assistance of counsel includes, at
a bare minimum, filing a request for discovery from the State.
Standards of practice maintained by the legal profession show that filing a
request for discovery is part of a reasonable investigation.
(a) Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of
conviction. The investigation should include efforts to secure information in
the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or
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statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the accused's
stated desire to plead guilty.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3d ed. 1991 ),
Defense Function, Standard 4-4.1 (emphasis added); see also Rompi/la, 545 U.S. at
383 (failure to investigate material relied upon by prosecution was unreasonable);
Williams, 529 U.S. 362(unreasonable failure to conduct thorough investigation).

The Idaho Criminal Rules provide a mechanism for a criminal defense attorney to
fulfill his professional obligation to secure information in the possession of the
prosecution and law enforcement. Idaho Criminal Rule 16 provides that the State must
automatically disclose evidence "which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to
the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment therefor," and "the
general nature of' 404(b) evidence it intends to introduce at trial. I.C.R. 16(a). However,
the majority of information and evidence within the State's control need only be
disclosed "upon written request by the defendant .... " I.C .R. 16(b).
In addition, the ABA standards address the advice defense counsel must provide
to a client. "After informing himself or herself fully on the facts and the law, defense
counsel should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the
case, including a candid estimate of the probable outcome." ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function (3d ed. 1991 ), Defense Function, Standard

4-5.1 (emphasis added).
In the present case, defense counsel had a duty to investigate the facts of
Mr. Hoffman's case prior to making strategic decisions or advising Mr. Hoffman about all
aspects of the case, including possible defenses or plea bargains avallable. Yet,
counsel did not request discovery to obtain evidence the State would likely use, which
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was readily available for the asking. Taking Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions as true,
counsels' performance was deficient. However, in its Answer, the State generally
denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions that were not specifically admitted.
(R., pp.79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in
Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred
when it summarily dismissed this claim.

3.

There Was A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether Mr. Hoffman
Was Prejudiced By Counsels' Deficient Performance, Which If Resolved
In Mr. Hoffman's Favor, Would Entitle Him To The Requested Post
Conviction Relief

The district court found that "Mr. Hoffman presented no alternative version of the
facts that his attorney(s) failed to discover that may have changed the outcome of the
case." (R., p.102.) The court also determined that 'The petitioner supplies no additional
facts that would reasonably merit further investigation, nor does he provide evidence of
any discovery that his attorney(s) failed to complete." (R., p.102.) In its subsequent
Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district court found, "the
Petitioner still failed to demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no evidence that the
outcome of his case would have been different but for his attorneys' unprofessional
errors." (R., p.164.)
The district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claims. First, the
district court erred when it applied an incorrect legal standard to the claims. Second,
Mr. Hoffman did offer evidence that, had counsel requested discovery, counsel would
have discovered facts showing that both the stop and search of the car's trunk were
illegal such that a motion to suppress would have been successful. He also established
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that had counsel discovered the facts, he would have had a viable defense to the
possession of a controlled substance charge and would not have pleaded guilty.

a.

The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard To
Mr. Hoffman's Prejudice Claim

It must be initially noted that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard
to the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court dismissed
Mr. Hoffman's claims based, in part, upon its general finding that in regards to his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims Mr. Hoffman had failed to demonstrate
prejudice, as he offered no evidence that the outcome of his case would have been
different but for his attorneys' unprofessional errors." (R., p.164.) As noted in section
8(2), supra, a petitioner need only show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). In requiring that Mr. Hoffman show that
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, the court applied a standard
that is "diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed"
to the clearly established precedent in Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.

b.

Mr. Hoffman's Unrebutted Factual Assertions, Taken As True,
Establish A Reasonable Probability That, Had His Attorneys
Obtained Discovery In His Case The Evidence Would Have Shown
That The Stop Of His Car Was Illegal Such That The Evidence
Found In The Car Would Have Been Suppressed

Mr. Hoffman met his burden of establishing prejudice. Mr. Hoffman asserted that
he would not have agreed to plead guilty had discovery been provided, in part because
"the loss of the wrongly obtained evidence would have resulted in an acquittal."
(R., p.127; see also R., p.128.) Where a post conviction petitioner was convicted upon a
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guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice element, the applicant seeking relief from the
conviction generally must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). This requires a showing that a decision to not accept
a plea agreement and plead guilty would have been rational under the circumstances.

Padilla v. Kentucky,_ U.S._, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010). Because Mr. Hoffman
asserted facts which would have resulted in the suppression of the evidence of
possession of a controlled substance, Mr. Hoffman established a reasonable probability
that, absent his counsel's deficient performance, he would not have accepted a plea
agreement.
Mr. Hoffman stated that on the night he was stopped, he was driving a borrowed
car that he was considering purchasing. (R., p.11.) As he backed out of a parking space
at McDonald's, he saw that both headlights were working. (R., p.6.) He had only been
driving the car for about fifteen minutes when officers stopped him, claiming the car had
a broken headlight. (R., pp.6, 15.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that the traffic stop was based
upon a claimed malfunctioning headlight, but that the headlight was not malfunctioning
and "he personally observed the fact that both headlights were functional just prior to
the traffic stop." (R., p.143.)
A traffic stop by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's
occupants which implicates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well as Article 1, section 17 of the Idaho constitution. See Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293 (1988)(holding
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"When a vehicle is stopped by a police officer and its occupants are detained, a seizure
within the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 17 of the
Idaho Constitution has occurred .... " Id. at 295.).) Such a stop must be supported by
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic
laws or that either the vehicle or the occupant is subject to detention in connection with
a violation of other laws. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App. 1996). This
reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but more than
speculation or instinct on the part of an officer. Id. In Idaho, the exclusionary rule is
applied to provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an
unreasonable government seizure. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 993 (1992). Where
evidence is obtained as a result of an illegal stop, that evidence must be excluded as
fruit of the poisonous tree. See e.g., State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 709
(Ct. App. 2007).
Taking as true Mr. Hoffman's assertions that the officer justified the traffic stop on
a malfunctioning headlight, but that both headlights were properly functioning, the stop
of Mr. Hoffman's car was not based upon reasonable suspicion, the resulting seizure
violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution and Article 1, section
17 of the Idaho constitution, such that all evidence seized as a result of the stop must
be excluded as fruit of an illegal stop. Thus, a motion to suppress could have
succeeded and altered the outcome of Mr. Hoffman's case. The district court erred in
summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claim.
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C.

Mr. Hoffman's Unrebutted Factual Assertions, Taken As True,
Establish A Reasonable Probability That, Had His Attorneys
Obtained Discovery In His Case The Evidence Would Have Shown
That The Search Of His Car Was Illegal Such That The Evidence
Found In The Car Would Have Been Suppressed

Mr. Hoffman stated that the officers detained him while investigating and
charging him with "several misdemeanors." (R., p.7.) Without Mr. Hoffman's consent,
and without a warrant, officers searched the trunk of the car Mr. Hoffman had been
driving and discovered paraphernalia with residue in the trunk of the car. (R., pp.7, 24,
126.) Although the officer asserted that the search was done pursuant to the search
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement, Mr. Hoffman had already been
removed from the vehicle before it was searched and items in the trunk of the car were
not within Mr. Hoffman's reaching distance. (R., pp.7-8, 144.) The search of the car was
actually done for investigative purposes. (R., p. 7.)
It is a basic rule that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to

a few specifically established

exceptions." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, _

and

well-delineated

129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009)(citation

omitted); see a/so lo. CONST. art. 1, §17. Among the exceptions to the warrant
requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Id. (citation omitted). A search
incident to arrest may only include "the arrestee's person and the area 'within his
immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Id. (quoting Chime! v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
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The search of the trunk of the car, despite the fact that Mr. Hoffman had been
removed from the car and the trunk was not within his immediate control, does not fall
within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. Taking
Mr. Hoffman's assertions of fact as true, the search was unreasonable and violated
Mr. Hoffman's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, section 17, of the Idaho constitution. In Idaho, the exclusionary rule is also
applied to provide an effective remedy to persons who have been subjected to an
unreasonable government search. See Guzman, 122 Idaho at 993. Thus, the
paraphernalia seized as the result of the illegal search of the trunk of the car
Mr. Hoffman was driving would have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961 ).
A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether or not the search of
Mr. Hoffman's car violated the Fourth Amendment. If the officer's search in fact violated
the Fourth Amendment, a motion to suppress could have succeeded and altered the
outcome of Hoffman's case. The district court, thus, erred in summarily dismissing
Mr. Hoffman's claim.

d.

Mr. Hoffman's Unrebutted Factual Assertions, Taken As True,
Establish A Reasonable Probability That, Had His Attorneys
Obtained Discovery In His Case The Evidence Would Have
Established Viable Defenses To The Possession Charge Such That
Mr. Hoffman Would Not Have Pleaded Guilty, But Would Have
Insisted On Going To Trial

Mr. Hoffman also offered facts to support his claim that, had counsel obtained
discovery and reviewed it with him, counsel would have discovered viable defenses to
the possession charge. (See R., pp.15, 29.) Mr. Hoffman asserted that counsel would
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have found that Mr. Hoffman did not own the car he was driving, but was just test
driving it, that he had just picked up the car fifteen minutes before the stop, and that he
was merely present in the car. (R., pp.8, 10, 11, 15, 26.) Mr. Hoffman further asserted
that he was factually innocent, that he had no knowledge of the paraphernalia found,
that he did not possess methamphetamine, that there was a reasonable doubt that the
paraphernalia belonged to him, and a fair trial would have proven his innocence to the
charge of possession. (R., pp.11, 21, 24, 25, 26.)
where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover
potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error
"prejudiced" the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to
trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would
have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This
assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the
evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.

Had counsel not performed deficiently, counsel would have discovered evidence
that police found the paraphernalia with methamphetamine residue in the trunk of a car
and that Mr. Hoffman did not own, but was merely driving. (R., pp.8, 10, 11, 15, 26.)
This coupled with Mr. Hoffman's lack of prior knowledge of the item, and the fact that he
was only test driving the car for fifteen minutes before the stop occurred established a
reasonable defense to the charge of possession of a controlled substance.
Constructive possession is generally established by proof that a defendant had
knowledge of the substance and possessed dominion and control over it. State v.
Clayton, 101 Idaho 15 (1980). "In other words, constructive possession exists where a

nexus between the accused and the controlled substance is sufficiently proven so as to
give rise to the reasonable inference that the accused was not simply a bystander but,
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rather, had the power and the intent to exercise dominion or control over the
[substance]." State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784 (Ct. App. 1987). The lack of a nexus
between the paraphernalia found in the trunk of the car and Mr. Hoffman was a defense
to the charge of constructive possession as there was no evidence giving rise to a
reasonable inference that Mr. Hoffman was more than a bystander. Mr. Hoffman's
unrebutted assertion of lack of knowledge of the presence of the item, taken as true,
shows that the State could not have had evidence that he had the intent to exercise
dominion or control over the paraphernalia or its accompanying residue. Thus, there is a
reasonable possibility that Mr. Hoffman had a defense to the charge such that he would
not pleaded guilty and the outcome of the proceedings would have been an acquittal.

e.

Even Assuming That The District Court Was Correct In Finding
That Mr. Hoffman Had Failed To Offer Sufficient Evidence To
Support His Prejudice Claim, Mr. Hoffman Recited Why The
Information Was Not Attached And Requested That The State
Produce Discovery Such That The Record Would Contain The
Relevant Information

Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations shall be attached
to the application or the application shall recite why they are not attached." I.C. §194903. Admittedly, Mr. Hoffman did not provide the court with actual copies of the
discovery materials that defense counsel would have received had a request for
discovery been filed. However, initially Mr. Hoffman informed the court that he still had
not obtained the discovery from his criminal case. (R., pp.3, 7, 24.) After the district court
appointed post conviction counsel, counsel never filed a request for discovery. ( See
generally Record.) After post conviction counsel had been appointed, Mr. Hoffman

explained that, he had "attempted to convince prior legal counsel to present these
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issues but was ignored or denied each time." (R., p.122 (emphasis added.) In his
response to the court's notice of intent to dismiss, filed pro se, Mr. Hoffman again
requested the appointment of legal counsel. (R., p.129.) He also asserted that "many of
the documents which the petitioner requires in order to prove his case have been
denied to him by the prosecutor and by his own legal counsel." (R., p.129.) "As a result,
much of the documentation cannot be provided by the petitioner at this time, until his
repeated requests for discovery are finally fulfilled." (R., p.129.)
Because Mr. Hoffman recited why the necessary documents were not attached,
and repeatedly asserted that he could not provide them without discovery, and notified
the court that his counsel was ignoring and denying his requests for this discovery, the
district court erred in summarily dismissing his claims. Summary dismissal is only
appropriate where "no purpose would be served by any further proceedings." I.C. §194906(b). However, addressing Mr. Hoffman's renewed request for counsel and
conducting discovery proceedings in this case would serve the purpose of providing
Mr. Hoffman with the documents he asserted would support his claims. Thus, further
proceedings would serve a further purpose, and summary dismissal was inappropriate.

D.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That
His Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When Each Failed To
File A Motion To Suppress 1
The district court dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claim that his counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel when they failed to file a motion to suppress, in part,
because "the Petitioner offered no factual basis or evidentiary support" for the claim.
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(R., p.103.) The court also dismissed this claim because it should have been brought in
a direct appeal, because Mr. Hoffman did not raise the claim at the time he pleaded
guilty, and because post conviction "is not the forum to make a claim regarding failure to
suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized." (R., pp.103-104.) For the reasons argued
below, the district court's bases for dismissing Mr. Hoffman's claim are neither
supported by the record nor based on proper legal theories or reasoning. In fact, some
of the district court's holdings are based upon a fundamental misunderstandi11g of
constitutional law, a misreading of case law, and are in direct contravention of both the
Idaho Supreme Court's and the United States Supreme Court's clearly established
precedent. Thus, the district court's order dismissing this claim should be vacated.

1. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim
For Lack Of A Factual Basis Or Evidentiary Support

a.

The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Hoffman Failed To
Offer Evidentiary Support For His Claim That His Counsel
Performed Deficiently When Each Failed To File A Motion To
Suppress And That He Was Prejudiced By This Deficient
Performance

Mr. Hoffman asserted that his attorneys failed to file a motion to suppress in his
case, and that he had specifically asked his appointed attorney to file such a motion.
(R., pp.8, 13.) In addition, he attached the register of actions from the underlying
criminal case to his petition, which showed that a motion to suppress was not filed.
(R., pp.42-43.) As noted is section C, supra, Mr. Hoffman alleged facts to support the
filing of a motion to suppress.

1

Because Mr. Mallard did not represent Mr. Hoffman until after Mr. Hoffman had
pleaded guilty, such that he could not have filed a motion to suppress, Mr. Hoffman's
claim only appropriately applies to Mr. Dewey, Mr. Nielson, and Mr. Martinez.
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In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a
motion in the underlying action, the court properly may consider the probability of
success of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity
constituted incompetent performance. Baldwin, 145 Idaho 155 (citation omitted).
Similarly, the failure of counsel to file a motion to suppress will satisfy the prejudice
prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test where the reviewing court determines
that the evidence at issue would have been suppressed. State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho
300, 308 (1999); see also Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)(finding that
when failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is principal allegation of
ineffectiveness, petitioner must also prove that Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious
and there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent
the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Id. at 375).
When Mr. Hoffman's unrebutted factual assertions are taken as true, the search
of Mr. Hoffman's car violated the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Hoffman's assertions in this
regard are further articulated in section l(C)(b )-( c), supra, and are incorporated herein
by reference thereto. If the officer's search in fact violated the Fourth Amendment, a
motion to suppress could have succeeded and altered the outcome of Hoffman's case.
However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual
assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp.79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine
issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle
Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed this
claim.
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b.

Even Assuming That The District Court Was Correct In Finding
That Mr. Hoffman Had Failed To Offer Sufficient Evidence To
Support His Prejudice Claim, Mr. Hoffman Recited Why The
Information Was Not Attached And Requested That The State
Produce Discovery Such That The Record Would Contain The
Relevant Information

Mr. Hoffman's claims in this regard are identical to the claims made in section
l(C)(3)(e), supra, which need not be repeated here. Rather, the argument, authority and
citations to the record are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

C.

In Addition, The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard
To Mr. Hoffman's Prejudice Claim

Additionally, in its Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district
court applied an incorrect legal standard to the prejudice prong of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. The court dismissed Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, in part, based upon its finding that "Petitioner still failed to
demonstrate prejudice, as he offered no evidence that the outcome of his case would

have been different but for his attorney's unprofessional errors." (R., p.164 (emphasis
added).) As previously noted, in section 8(2), supra, a petitioner need only show a

"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694(emphasis added). In
requiring that Mr. Hoffman show that the outcome of the proceedings would have been
different the court applied a standard that is "diametrically different," "opposite in
character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to the clearly established precedent in

Strickland. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.
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2.

The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Hoffman Could Not Raise
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim In Post Conviction Because It
Could Have Been Raised In A Direct Appeal

The district court summarily dismissed Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim based, in part, upon its finding that "a petitioner in a post-conviction
proceeding is not allowed to raise any issue that could have been raised on a direct
appeal, but was not so raised, unless those issues were not known and could not have
reasonably been known at the time of the appeal." (R., pp.103.) The court also found
that "The failure to suppress evidence allegedly illegally seized is not fundamental error
which may be cured in a post-conviction relief proceeding even though the error could
have been, but was not raised on direct appeal." (R., pp.103 (citing Nelson v. State, 124
Idaho 596 (Ct. App. 1993) and Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493 (Ct. App. 1985).) The
district court erred in dismissing Mr. Hoffman's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
this regard as the ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not have been raised in
a direct appeal.
Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved for
appeal through an objection at trial. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224 (201 O), reh'g
denied (Dec. 7, 201 O),(citation omitted). "If there is insufficient evidence in the appellate
record to show clear error, the matter would be better handled in post-conviction
proceedings." Id. at 226. If a petitioner wishes the appellate court to consider evidence
of ineffective assistance of counsel outside the record on direct appeal, he must pursue
the issue in a post conviction action. See Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 443.
In making his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Hoffman extensively
relied upon evidence outside of the record that would not have been available in a direct
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appeal. (See R., pp.1-31; see also section l(C), supra.) Thus, Mr. Hoffman could not
have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a direct appeal, even if he had
not been denied a direct appeal through additional ineffective assistance of counsel.

( See subsection F, supra, addressing Mr. Hoffman's claims regarding the denial of an
appellate proceeding.)
In addition, the two cases relied upon by the district court to hold that
Mr. Hoffman could not raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim do not support
the district court's holding. In each case, the post conviction petitioner's claim regarding
suppression of evidence was not an ineffective assistance of counsel claim at all, such
that they do not address the issue that was before the district court in the case at bar.

See Nelson, 124 Idaho at 598; Maxfield, 108 Idaho at 497, 500. Furthermore, in
Maxfield, the issues had been "extensively litigated before a magistrate on a pretrial
motion to suppress ... ," and in Nelson, a motion to suppress had been filed prior to trial,
such that the suppression issues were preserved for review on direct appeal. Nelson,
124 Idaho at 598; Maxfield, 108 Idaho at 500. Such is not the case here.
Because Mr. Hoffman could not have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim in a direct appeal, the district court erred in dismissing his claim on that ground.
3.

The District Court Erred When It Found That Mr. Hoffman Could Not Raise
His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim In Post Conviction Because
He Did Not Raise The Issue At The Time He Entered His Guilty Plea And
Waived His Right To File A Motion To Suppress When He Pleaded Guilty

The district court sought to justify summarily dismissing Mr. Hoffman's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, in part, upon the fact that Mr. Hoffman did not raise the
claim at the time he pleaded guilty, "at which time he waived all claims he might have
for violations of civil and constitutional rights." (R., pp.103.) Similarly, the district court
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summarily dismissed the claim because Mr. Hoffman waived his right to file a motion to
suppress at the time he pleaded guilty. (R., p.104.) The district court's holdings in this
regard evidence a fundamental misunderstanding of both the kind and nature of the
claim Mr. Hoffman raised.
Mr. Hoffman repeatedly asserted that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel. (R., pp. 9, 12, 15-16, 29.) Mr. Hoffman asserted a violation of his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, which would include the right to effective assistance of
counsel. (R., p.2; see a/so Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).) Thus,
Mr. Hoffman did not seek to "merely avail himself of the exclusionary rule," rather, in this
collateral attack on his conviction he sought, and continues to seek, to protect his
personal right effective assistance of counsel. See Kimme/man, 477 U.S., 378. While
Mr. Hoffman's "defaulted Fourth Amendment claim is one element of proof of his Sixth
Amendment claim, the two claims have separate identities and reflect different
constitutional values." Id. at 375.
The district court's presumption that Mr. Hoffman should have asserted his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the time of his plea, the very time he asserts
he was

actively receiving

ineffective assistance of counsel,

and waived the

constitutional claim when he entered his plea, ignores the nature of an effective waiver
of a constitutional right. A defendant may waive a right of constitutional magnitude, so
long as the defendant does so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Perry, 150
Idaho at 227; see a/so United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) ("Waiver is
different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of
a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."').
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However, when a person receives ineffective assistance of counsel it impacts any
alleged waivers of constitutional claims made at that time, including the alleged waiver
of Mr. Hoffman's right to effective assistance of counsel. "'Of all the rights that an
accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."' Kimme/man,
477 U.S. at 377(emphasis added) (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956)). In fact, "without counsel the right to a fair trial
itself would be of little consequence ... for it is through counsel that the accused
secures his other rights." Id. (citation omitted and emphasis added). The district court
failed to comprehend that whether Mr. Hoffman received ineffective assistance of
counsel informs the review of whether any waivers he may have made during the guilty
plea process were made knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily.
Moreover, any waiver of the right to effective assistance of counsel, entered at
the time the defendant is still burdened with ineffective counsel, is not a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
defendants typically cannot identify the fact that they are receiving ineffective assistance
of counsel at the time they are receiving it.

A layman will ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel's errors and to
evaluate counsel's professional performance, ... consequently a criminal
defendant will rarely know that he has not been represented competently
until after trial or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about
his case. Indeed, an accused will often not realize that he has a
meritorious ineffectiveness claim until he begins collateral review
proceedings, particularly if he retained trial counsel on direct appeal.
Kimme/man, 477 U.S. at 378.

43

The entire premise of the constitutional right to counsel is that defendants are not
expected to have sufficient knowledge of the law to assert their own claims without the
assistance of counsel.
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally,
of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If
that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
Powell v. State of Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)(emphasis added). These dangers are no
less relevant when a defendant lacks effective assistance of counsel than when they
are denied counsel altogether. The Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel
cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment of counsel. Avery v. State of Alabama,
308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). Rather, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance
of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
In sum, the district court erred in finding that Mr. Hoffman could not litigate his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this post conviction action because he didn't
assert it at the time he pleaded guilty. As the United States Supreme Court recognized
many years ago, to deny a petitioner a collateral attack on his conviction which is based
primarily on incompetent handling of Fourth Amendment issues would deny most
defendants whose trial attorneys performed incompetently in this regard the opportunity
to vindicate their right to effective trial counsel. Kimme/man, 477 U.S. at 378. This would
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"severely interfere with the protection of the constitutional rights asserted" by the post
conviction petitioner. Id.

The district court's summary dismissal of Mr. Hoffman's

ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to file a motion to suppress based
upon the fact that he didn't raise the claim when he pleaded guilty must be vacated.

E.

The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That
His Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When He Failed To
Adequately Consult With Mr. Hoffman About Filing An Appeal Arid Failed File A
Timely Notice Of Appeal Despite A Specific Request That He Do So
Following the entry of the Judgment of Conviction, during the period of retained

jurisdiction, Mr. Mallard sent Mr. Hoffman a letter regarding his right to appeal.
(R., p.37.) This letter claimed that Mr. Hoffman had only 42 days to file an appeal, and
told Mr. Hoffman that if he wanted an appeal he not only had to notify Mr. Mallard
"immediately," but that he also had to notify Mr. Mallard of "grounds that are
appealable." (R., p.37.) The letter further offered as an example of "legal grounds" for
direct appeal "ineffective assistance of counsel." (R., p.37.)
Mr. Hoffman attempted to call Mr. Mallard after sentencing, but Mr. Mallard's
office would not accept his calls. (R., p.20.) Accordingly, Mr. Hoffman asserted that
Mr. Mallard, "should have consulted Hoffman regarding his right to appeal when
inquired, but did not." (R., p.19.) Mr. Hoffman also stated that after he received the
October 23, 2008 letter from Mr. Mallard, he attempted to contact Mr. Mallard to request
that an appeal be filed. (R., p.37.) In his verified pleadings, Mr. Hoffman stated that he
"specifically asked/requested Kelly to file a Direct appeal of the original sentence
through letters, family members calling." (R., p.18.) Yet Mr. Mallard did not undertake
the ministerial task of filing a notice of appeal. (R., p.19.)
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1.

Mr. Mallard Rendered Deficient Performance When He Failed To File The
Requested Notice Of Appeal And When He Failed To Adequately Consult
With Mr. Hoffman Regarding Whether To Appeal

The district court found that Mr. Hoffman's claim that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to file a timely appeal despite requests
to do so was "disproved by the record." (R., p.105.) The court's finding was premised
upon the fact that letters Mr. Hoffman sent to his attorney, after the time to appeal had
expired, did not include a request for an appeal, and that there were letters from
Mr. Mallard to Mr. Hoffman "neither of which verifies the Petitioner's claims that he
requested Mr. Mallard file an appeal on his behalf." {R., p.105-106.)

a.

Mr. Mallard Rendered Deficient Performance When He Failed To
File The Requested Notice Of Appeal

The district court incorrectly determined that Mr. Hoffman's claim was disproved
by the record. Although Mr. Hoffman did attach copies of letters he had sent to
Mr. Mallard, after the time to appeal had expired, which did not include specific requests
that an appeal be filed, he did not assert that this was the only contact he had with
Mr. Mallard, and it was not the sum total of the facts alleged. Mr. Hoffman's verified
pleadings additionally asserted that, Mr. Hoffman "specifically asked/requested Kelly to
file a Direct appeal of the original sentence through letters, family members calling."
{R., p.18.)
The district court acknowledged Mr. Hoffman asserted that, at some point he had
made a specific request that an appeal be filed, but rejected this factual assertion
because it was not verified by Mr. Mallard's letters. (See R., pp.104-105.) In determining
whether to render summary judgment, where the facts are disputed, a court is required

46

to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true. Charboneau, 144 Idaho
at 903. There is no requirement that the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations be
otherwise verified by the attorney that the petitioner asserts rendered deficient
performance. Thus, the district court's rejection of Mr. Hoffman's unrebutted factual
assertion while summarily dismissing the claim was error.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that a lawyer who
disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a
manner that is professionally unreasonable. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477
(2000). Thus, taking Mr. Hoffman's factual assertion that he specifically requested Mr.
Mallard file an appeal as true, Mr. Mallard's failure to file an appeal when specifically
requested to do so is deficient performance.

b.

Because Mr. Mallard Failed To Adequately Consult With
Mr. Hoffman About Taking An AppeaL His Performance Was
Deficient

In addition, the district court relied upon an October 23, 2008, letter Mr. Mallard
sent to Mr. Hoffman as sufficient explanation of Mr. Hoffman's appellate rights. In doing
so, the court ignored the fact that the information Mr. Mallard did provide to Mr. Hoffman
regarding his appellate rights was patently incorrect legal advice. Even if Mr. Hoffman
had not specifically requested that Mr. Mallard file a notice of appeal, Mr. Mallard's
proffering of incorrect legal advice and failure to adequately consult with Mr. Hoffman
regarding the filing of an appeal after the district court relinquished jurisdiction over
Mr. Hoffman was deficient performance.
In Mr. Mallard's October 23, 2008 letter to Mr. Hoffman counsel provided
incorrect legal advice on both when Mr. Hoffman could appeal and how Mr. Hoffman
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could have an appeal filed. In 2008, the Idaho Appellate Rules made it clear that "In a
criminal case, the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of time the district
court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code." Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a)
(2008). The district court entered its Minute Entry And Order And Commitment Order, in
which the district court adjudged Mr. Hoffman guilty and retained jurisdiction on October
20, 2008. (Supp. R., pp.34-31.) Thus, Mr. Hoffman could timely file a notice of appeal
any time after this judgment was entered until 42 days after the court's period of
retained jurisdiction ended. Despite this, Mr. Mallard claimed, "The time to file your
appeal is 42 days from the date of conviction." (R., p.37.) Mr. Mallard affirmatively
misled Mr. Hoffman as to the time period for filing a notice of appeal.
Mr. Mallard further claimed that Mr. Hoffman had to notify him not only of a desire
to appeal, but as to "grounds that are appealable." (R., p.37.) There is no support in the
law for this claim. Prevailing professional standards establish that the decision of
whether to file an appeal is ultimately to be made by the defendant, not the attorney.
ASA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Function, (3d ed. 1991 ),
Defense Function, Standard 4-5.2(a)(v). Counsel does not make a strategic decision as
to whether to file an appeal. Roe, 528 U.S. at 477. Rather, "filing a notice of appeal is a
purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflect[s] inattention to the defendant's
wishes." Id. Mr. Mallard's incorrect legal advice to Mr. Hoffman that he not only had to
notify counsel of his desire to appeal, but also had to justify that desire by establishing
to Mr. Mallard "grounds that are appealable" was deficient performance.
Mr. Mallard's proffering of incorrect legal advice on both when Mr. Hoffman could
appeal and how Mr. Hoffman could have an appeal filed was deficient performance.
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Mr. Mallard's failure to consult with Mr. Hoffman after the district court
relinquished jurisdiction was also deficient performance. The district court relinquished
jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman despite the fact that Mr. Hoffman completed all required
programming during the period of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.18; Supp. R., p.38.)
Mr. Hoffman was not transported to the district court for his rider review hearing, such
that he could not consult with Mr. Mallard about an appeal at that time. (R., p.28.)
Mr. Hoffman stated that after he was sentenced he attempted to call Mr. Mallard, but
Mr. Mallard's office would not accept his calls. (R., p.20.) Mr. Hoffman attempted to
contact Mr. Mallard on numerous occasions, and ultimately began keeping a log of his
attempts, which shows that when he would call, Mr. Mallard's office would simply hang
up on him. (R., p.41.)
Counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about
an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want
to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that
this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in
appealing. Roe, 528 U.S. at 480. To "consult" with a defendant regarding filing an
appeal has "a specific meaning-advising the defendant about the advantages and
disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the
defendant's wishes.'' Id. at 478. The United State Supreme Court expects that courts
applying this test "will find, in the vast majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to
consult with the defendant about an appeal." Id. at 481.
In the present case, Mr. Mallard had a duty to consult with Mr. Hoffman because
there were nonfrivolous grounds to appeal, i.e. whether the district court abused its
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discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Mr. Hoffman, and because Mr. Hoffman
was repeatedly attempting to contact Mr. Mallard, from which Mr. Mallard should have
recognized that Mr. Hoffman was reasonably demonstrating that he was interested in
appealing.
Although where "a sentencing court's instructions to a defendant about his
appeal rights in a particular case [can be] so clear and informative as to substitute for
counsel's duty to consult," that was not what happened in Mr. Hoffman's case. Like
Mr. Mallard, the district court affirmatively misled Mr. Hoffman in regards to his right to
appeal. The judgment stated, "Defendant is herewith advised that in the event said
Defendant desires to appeal the foregoing sentence, said appeal must be filed with the
Idaho Supreme Court no later than forty-two days from the date said sentence is
imposed." (Supp. R., p.36.) The district court provided no instructions on Mr. Hoffman's
appellate rights in the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., p.38-39.) Thus, Mr. Mallard
was not relieved of his duty to consult with Mr. Hoffman.
Taking Hoffman's unrebutted factual assertions as true, Mr. Mallard's failure to
provide correct legal advice regarding Mr. Hoffman's appellate rights and failure to
adequately consult with Mr. Hoffman following the relinquishment of jurisdiction was
deficient performance. However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of
Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp.79-80.)
Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor,
would entitle Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily
dismissed this claim.
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2.

Mr. Hoffman Was Prejudiced By Mr. Mallard's Failures Because
Mr. Hoffman Was Deprived Of Counsel At A Critical Stage Of The
Proceedings And Denied Appellate Proceedings Altogether

In regards to prejudice, the district court dismissed Mr. Hoffman's claim based
upon the finding "no argument is made regarding how the outcome of his case would
have changed." (R., p.106.) In doing so, the district court applied an incorrect legal
analysis. See Roe, 528 U.S. at 482-83. Rather, when an attorney renders deficient
performance by failing to file a requested notice of appeal or by failing to properly
consult with the defendant about an appeal, and that failure results in the forfeiture of an
appeal, "counsel's deficient performance has deprived respondent of more than a fair
judicial proceeding; that deficiency deprived respondent of the appellate proceeding
altogether." Roe, 528 U.S. at 482-83. The denial of counsel during a critical stage and
the resulting denial of an entire judicial proceeding "demands a presumption of
prejudice." Id.
Taking Mr. Hoffman's factual assertions as true, prejudice is presumed in this
instance. However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual
assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp.79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine
issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle
Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed this
claim.
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IV.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Hoffman's Claim That His
Plea Was Not Entered Knowingly, Intelligently, Or Voluntarily Because It Was The
Result Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
Mr. Hoffman asserted that his plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily
entered because it was coerced by his counsels' failure to request discovery, failure to
file a motion to suppress, and failure to inform him of, or to pursue, defenses to the
charge. (See R., pp. 9, 3, 10, 25, 140, 142, 144-45, 146.) He further asserted that
counsel erroneously told him that the mere fact that he was driving the car where the
paraphernalia with residue was found was sufficient to convict Mr. Hoffman for
possession. (R., p.146.)
In its Notice of Intent to Dismiss, the district court interpreted Mr. Hoffman's
claims regarding the failure to pursue or inform him of defenses as merely an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. (R., pp.106-108.) The court found that Mr. Hoffman had
"waived his right to present a defense or challenge any of the charges against him when
he plead guilty." (R., pp.106-07.) The court also found that "there was no contention at
the time Mr. Hoffman pleaded guilty that his attorney had failed to discuss the case with
him or explain possible defenses." (R., p.107.) Further, the court determined that,
because Mr. Hoffman waived his right to a jury trial when he pleaded guilty, it was
irrelevant whether counsel discussed potential defenses with him. (R., pp.107-08.) The
court concluded that Mr. Hoffman had failed to provide "facts or evidence to
demonstrate he was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency or how such deficiency
changed the outcome of his case." (R., p.108.)
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In addition, the district court found that Mr. Hoffman had presented "no evidence
of any coercion by his attorney(s). He does not assert how he may have been
pressured to plead guilty." (R., p.110.) The court determined that the record of the guilty
plea proceedings established that Mr. Hoffman entered a voluntary plea because
Mr. Hoffman stated at that time that he had not been threatened into pleading guilty,
established the terms of the plea agreement, and because Mr. Hoffman said his plea
was "entirely voluntary and of your own free wiill." (R., pp.110-11.) The court found that
"there is no evidence to support the Petitioner's contention that he felt coerced into
accepting the plea agreement or that his counsel was in any way ineffective in the entry
of the plea." (R., pp.112.) Finally, the court concluded, "Mr. Hoffman has only offered
bare and conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence .... "
(R., p.113.)
In the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief, the district court
reiterated its finding that Mr. Hoffman had "only offered conclusory and bare allegations
in regard to this argument," and found that Mr. Hoffman had only set "forth self-serving
statements and legal conclusions, but does not point to the record or offer other proof to
support his contentions." (R., p.160.)
Mr. Hoffman submits that the district court erred when it relied upon the records
of the taking of his guilty plea, to the exclusion of other evidence regarding the
circumstances of the entry of the plea, to determine that the plea was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered . When all the evidence is considered, Mr. Hoffman
did offer sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
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his plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered such that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on this claim.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, "It is elementary that a
coerced plea is open to collateral attack." Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215
(1973). This is true even when a petitioner bases his claims on things that occurred
prior to the taking of the plea and informed the court, at the time the plea was entered,
that it was "given voluntarily and knowingly, that he understood the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea, and that he was in fact guilty." Id. at 213-214.
Although the objective of following Idaho Criminal Rule 11 procedures is to flush out and
resolve issues regarding the plea, "like any procedural mechanism, its exercise is
neither always perfect nor uniformly invulnerable to subsequent challenge calling for an
opportunity to prove the allegations" of coercion. Cf Id. at 215(addressing Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11 ).
Although the record of guilty plea proceedings is relevant to a subsequent claim
that the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily, "the barrier of the
plea

or

sentencing

proceeding

insurmountable." Blackledge v.

record,

although

Allison, 431

imposing,

U.S. 63,

is

not

invariably

74 (U.S.N.C. 1977). In

administering the writ of habeas corpus "federal courts cannot fairly adopt a per se rule
excluding all possibility that a defendant's representations at the time his guilty plea was
accepted were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or
misrepresentation by others as to make the guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate
basis for imprisonment." Id. at 75. This Court sees the "Uniform Post Conviction
Procedure Act as an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and not as a denial of the
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same" See Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 237 (1969). In addressing post conviction
claims regarding the nature of a plea, this Court has not adopted a per se rule limiting
review to the record of the proceedings at which the plea was taken, to the exclusion of
additional evidence of what led to the entry of the plea. See McKeeth v. State, 140
Idaho 847 (2004)(considering evidence outside of the written plea agreement to
determine whether plea was entered as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel).
In limiting its consideration of whether Mr. Hoffman entered a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary plea to the record of the taking of the plea, to the exclusion of other
evidence in the post conviction record regarding the circumstances of the entry of the
plea, the district court erred.
The district court also erred when it found that Mr. Hoffman had only offered bare
and

conclusory

allegations

unsubstantiated

by

any

admissible

evidence .. . ,"

(R., pp.113), and that "there is no evidence to support the Petitioner's contention that he
felt coerced into accepting the plea agreement or that his counsel was in any way
ineffective in the entry of the plea" (R., pp.112). Mr. Hoffman offered evidence that his
plea was entered as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, including his attorneys
failure to request discovery, failure to file a motion to suppress, and misunderstanding of
the elements of the crime.

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) claim that a guilty plea is
invalid because it was not knowlngly, intelligently, or voluntarlly entered into may be
raised in a post-conviction petition. State v. Sands, 121 Idaho 1023 (Ct. App . 1992).
Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea
process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness
of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice ''was within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v.
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Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763
(1970). As we explained in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct.
1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), a defendant who pleads guilty upon the
advice of counsel "may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character
of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was
not within the standards set forth in McMann." Id., at 267, 93 S.Ct., at
1608.

Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57.
Taking Mr. Hoffman's factual allegations as true, the advice counsel gave to
Mr. Hoffman regarding entering a plea was not within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in a criminal case. Counsel advised Mr. Hoffman to plead guilty
without having properly investigated the case to determine possible defenses to the
charges, including suppression of the evidence. Mr. Hoffman's assertions in this regard
are fully articulated in sections l(C) and (D), supra, and are incorporated herein by
references thereto.
In addition, counsel misinformed 1\/lr. Hoffman of the elements of the crime to
which he was pleading guilty when he told Mr. Hoffman that "the fact that he was driving
the vehicle was enough to conviction him of possession." (R., p.146.) The United States
Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea, entered without the defendant/petitioner
understanding all of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty, is
constitutionally invalid. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618-619 (1998). The
Idaho Supreme Court has recognized this same basic principle and has held that,
"Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether
the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the

charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating
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himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading
guilty." State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34 (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that
in order to enter a valid guilty plea, the defendant must understand the nature of the
charge against him, including the elements of the crime charged.
Counsel's statement to Mr. Hoffman was erroneous. The simple fact that
Mr. Hoffman was driving a vehicle in which paraphernalia with residue was found in the
trunk is insufficient to convict Mr. Hoffman of possession of a controlled substance.
Mr. Hoffman's further support for this assertion is fully articulated in section l(C)(3)(d),
supra, which is incorporated herein by reference.

Taking the unrebutted factual assertions of Mr. Hoffman as true, as a result of
counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel in this case, counsel's advice to plead guilty
was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. As a
result, Mr. Hoffman's plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered.
However, in its Answer, the State generally denied all of Mr. Hoffman's factual
assertions that were not specifically admitted. (R., pp. 79-80.) Thus, there is a genuine
issue of material fact which, if resolved in Mr. Hoffman's favor, would entitle
Mr. Hoffman to relief such that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed this
claim.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the above argument and authority, Mr. Hoffman respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the district court's order summarily dismissing
Mr. Hoffman's claims and remand this case to the district court with an order that the
court hold an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Hoffman's claims.
DATED this 25th day of July, 2011.

SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
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